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The insurgent discourse of 1929 gave way to greater caution in 1930 as Stalin put the brakes on collectivization and the crisis in Germany deepened. Stress on 'the right danger' was superseded by Stalin's 'struggle on two fronts' -against 'right opportunism', which conciliated social democracy and 'left sectarianism', which failed to distinguish between workers moving towards socialism and leaders embracing capitalism. 'Trade union legalism' -operating constitutionally, playing by the bureaucrats' rules -and 'sectarian' desertion of union activity were both condemned. 4 The Comintern called for 'concrete' demands to replace 'revolutionary phrase-mongering' and counselled against 'schematic creation' of red unions. 5 Class against Class, its modulations and nuances, produced intermittent confusion in the national sections and placed a premium on deciphering Moscow's pronouncements. Nonetheless, from 1929 the line remained within ultra-left parameters. Its enduring pillars were capitalist crisis driving alleged radicalization and impending revolution -although phases of temporary stabilisation characterised the conjuncture. A defining feature was the evolution of social democracy into social fascism. The Labour Party's transformation from antipode to twin of fascism was complemented by integration of its base, the trade union bureaucracy, with capital and the state. 6 'Fascisisation' vaccinated the bureaucracy against rank and file pressure; officialdom shed its contradictions and mutated into an apparatus for disciplining and betraying workers.
Communists had to create an alternative leadership independent of the bureaucracy. The new line rejected the pre-1928 approach of moving the union apparatus left through making officials fightor replacing them. It discarded the united front with reformist leaders and permitted only a 'united front from below' with rank and file workers. Independent leadership demanded activity in workplaces and unions at local level -as well as among the radicalising unemployed and the unorganized -to assemble the revolutionary trade union opposition (RTUO). Exposing the bureaucracy in words and deeds, stimulating and leading unofficial strikes, would enable Communists to win workers away from the machine and, in propitious circumstances, establish revolutionary unions.
Mounting failure provoked attempts by the Comintern and its subordinate union counterpart, the Red International of Labour Unions (RILU), to correct the CPGB's misapplication of the line. Anxiety about its inability to benefit from capitalist crisis was lent urgency by the party's parlous performance in the 1931 general election. Discussions in Moscow produced a Comintern restatement unanimously adopted by the CPGB leadership in January 1932. 7 Pioneering historians of the CPGB and Comintern attached limited significance to the January resolution. Pelling referred to it briefly in describing contemporary changes in Communist policy. 8 Carr was dismissive: 'The resolution adopted by the central committee of the CPGB in January 1932, reflecting the current uncertainties in Moscow, was a repetition of formulas no more likely to prove effective than they had been in the past'. 9 Their successors have accorded it greater importance. For one historian, '..the resolution closed a chapter in the party's history…The CI was now prepared to back a move away from ultra-leftism in trade union work..'. 10 Another mused, '..it marked perhaps the real beginnings of an effective Communist presence in this country'. 11 Recent historiography portrays the January resolution as a turning point. Several accounts represent it as indicating significant change in Third Period policy and furnish innovation with a British provenance. The literature highlights the role of CPGB general secretary, Harry Pollitt, in the initiative. 12 It suggests Pollitt and his supporters had to overcome antagonism from RILU and its secretary Alexander Lozovsky, as well as ultra-left intransigents in the CPGB leadership. 13 Having secured agreement to the resolution, Pollitt, it is claimed, pushed beyond its prescriptions. He sought, purportedly with Comintern support and some success, to steer activists away from Class against Class towards something like the more pragmatic approach to union activity which prevailed in the popular front period. 14 This narrative displays differences of emphasis. It is not without evidential support but susceptible at several points to exaggeration and inaccuracy. This article re-examines key texts and measures them against primary sources. The next section explores whether the January resolution altered the Comintern line as it applied to Britain and is succeeded by examination of the problems the resolution aimed to rectify. This is followed by discussion of Pollitt's role. The fourth part of the paper reappraises ensuing debate in the CPGB and the extent to which it represented a project to transcend Third Period policy. The article concludes with reflections on union work in the aftermath of the resolution and the part it played in facilitating the building of a significant Communist base by the later 1930s.
The January resolution: revising the new line?
In their history of the Comintern, McDermott and Agnew note the impact of the Third Period on the CPGB which precipitated decline in membership to 2,555 by November 1930. They continue: 'The lesson drawn by General Secretary Pollitt was that a return to work within the unions was required, a return to a more practicable "united front from below." A change of line in this direction was in fact proclaimed following a bad-tempered session of the Profintern's (RILU) Central Council in December 1931..'. 15 (original emphasis). In her official history of the CPGB, Branson refers to the British Commission convened by the Comintern in Moscow the same month and observes: 'And, here, at last, Harry Pollitt was able to convince the ECCI that the attitude to the trade unions in Britain must be changed. Thus, the British Party was at last enabled to begin extricating itself from the "independent leadership" trap as laid down at the Leeds Congress'. 16 Eaden and Renton conclude: 'By January 1932, Pollitt had secured agreement from Moscow that "Class against Class" could be modified in respect of the need to win trade union support'. 17 Fuller asserts that Pollitt '..attacked the line at a meeting of the RILU Central Council in Moscow, arguing that the British party needed to mobilise opposition within the trade unions, not to form alternatives. As a result of this the CPGB was given dispensation to adopt its own line'. 18 (original emphasis). I will discuss the roles of Pollitt and RILU in a subsequent section. It is important to emphasise here that the comments quoted above all misunderstand the position in December 1931.
There was no need for Pollitt to convince the Comintern to change the line so that party activists could work within reformist trade unions: the Comintern had been attempting to convince the CPGB that its members should work within reformist unions throughout the previous two years. Like 'the united front from below', such engagement was an integral ingredient of independent leadership and Class against Class. This had been exhaustively explained to Pollitt by the ECCI and RILU. Some of the literature suffers from the further misapprehension that there were two lines. The first, attributed to Pollitt, demanded work inside existing unions and opposed new unions. The second downplayed activity in the reformist unions and favoured breakaway unions: it is ascribed to the RILU leader, Lozovsky, and CPGB 'ultra-lefts', notably Bill Rust. 19 The record does not justify this bifurcation. Forming red unions was contingent on activity in reformist unions. The two elements were fused in one line: building independent leadership through working inside existing unions to muster revolutionary forces and then, in specified circumstances, establishing revolutionary unions. 
Whatever their differences in interpretation and emphasis, all major protagonists accepted
Moscow doctrine on establishing new unions and intensifying activity in existing unions. The primary problem regarding reformist unions lay not with Comintern policy but CPGB practice. This is evident from a survey of the question in the two years preceding the January resolution. The ECCI letter to the Leeds Congress instructed delegates: 'The new line demands that Communist Parties, while not in the least diminishing their activity in the trade unions, initiate and develop independent organs of struggle embracing all the workers -the organised and particularly the unorganised -for the fight against the employers, as well as against the Fascist Labour Party and trade union bureaucracy'. 21 The Congress duly noted: 'The necessity for the independent leadership of all struggles in no way signifies the weakening of our work in the unions'. 22 In January 1930, the ECCI reminded CPGB leaders that activity in the mainstream unions remained indispensable. 23 In February 1930, the ECCI Presidium criticised British efforts in this direction: 'A marked tendency is observed by the Party to drop all work in the reformist trade unions. This is a grave mistake'. 24 The Comintern became more forceful. In August 1930 Dimitri Manuilsky, who represented the central committee of the Russian Party, lectured CPGB delegates:
You absolutely gave up work in the trade unions without having strengthened yourself in the factories. The Comintern told you to pay attention to the factories. And you drew the conclusion that you could throw up the work in the trade unions. The Comintern told you to build up a Minority Movement in the factories and you interpreted that as "out of the trade unions"…Anyone who looks on the new line as a refusal to manoeuvre in the reformist trade unions or a refusal to work in them does not understand the real essence of the new line. 25 On Manuilsky's account, CPGB leaders had failed to act on 'clear and exact directives', misinterpreted the united front from below to mean non-Communist militants had to accept party positions and neglected to devise immediate demands based on workers' expressed needs. The Comintern accepted partial blame but the CPGB must replace excuses and apologies with results.
He inquired: 'Should we change our line? No... I am talking about rectifying these mistakes… …the Anglo-American Secretariat has made accusing speeches against the English Communist Party. They have repeated hundreds of times that the English Communist Party does not know how to work…the English comrades should clearly consider…the mobilisation of the masses on the basis of their immediate needs by an extensive adoption of the tactic of the united front from below, by stubborn work in the trade unions, by the formation of a Minority Movement which is broader than the Party. 26 The resolution which came out of this meeting of the ECCI Political Secretariat was emphatic: the problems lay not with the line or the conjuncture but with the CPGB's failure to implement the line in favourable circumstances:
In practice the new line was frequently interpreted as the abandonment of the tactics of the united front from below…The independent leadership of economic struggles was very often taken to mean the abandonment of persistent organised work in the reformist trade unions…the Minority Movement must make a real turn towards systematic work in the reformist trade unions and must form a mass revolutionary opposition inside and outside the reformist unions…The MM must try to win elected positions in the local unions… 27 The British Commission convened in December 1930 mandated the Workers' Charter campaign which the ECCI insisted should be based on partial demands attractive to a wide constituency. The Comintern approved basic economic demands but criticised slogans which could alienate workers. 28 The Eleventh Plenum of the ECCI in Spring 1931 witnessed further severe strictures on the MM and CPGB. Party leaders were enjoined to use the Charter campaign to build the RTUO, starting with demands which flowed from dialogue with workers. 29 This was repeated in the line of independent leadership and of class against class has been wrongly interpreted as meaning the abandonment of work within the reformist unions, as seen in failure to conduct a fight around our programme in the unions; the nonattendance of MM members at trade union meetings; giving up of the fight for posts in the trade union branches; serious neglect of the struggle against the trade union bureaucrats…failure to select and popularise simple, practical, economic and political demands. 31 Lozovsky fostered successive initiatives to galvanise the MM, including despatching operatives to Britain. 32 In early 1931 a RILU commission dilated on the importance of work in the conventional unions. Lozovsky conceived the Charter campaign as a means of regenerating the MM and independent leadership; the RILU Open Letter of April 1931 was extensively discussed at the CC and formed the basis for the last Charter convention. For a time he advocated, and Pollitt accepted, integration of the MM and the unemployed movement. 33 If all this yielded little, it was not because CPGB leaders neglected Lozovsky's directives: they tried to realise them. As early as March 1930, the Daily Worker echoed RILU statements:
..there has been a decided falling off in the trade union work of our Party and a feeling that there are no further opportunities for work inside the reformist trade unions. This false theory is the essence of opportunism in practice, for it means the acceptance of the Tenth Plenum decisions but a refusal to carry them out. Today there is a clear understanding of the supreme need of the factory being the basis from which all our work should be carried out but a non-recognition of the necessity of also carrying the same work forward into the trade unions…The idea that we can no longer win workers, particularly in the branches and in the winning of posts…is incorrect. 34 RILU policy was expounded in the MM paper, The Worker, and the party press. Pollitt advised 'the necessity of studying the decision(s) of the 5 th Congress of the RILU. The leads from the International come from the RILU'. 35 Rust counselled 'extension of our work in the reformist trade unions...popularisation of the decisions of the Fifth Congress of the RILU and the Open Letter'. 36 MM leaders emphasised: '…the resolution of the Fifth Congress of the RILU on "The Tasks of the National Minority Movement" and the recent Open Letter of the RILU contain the whole of the policy and organisational measures which will be taken: every MM member and MM group should therefore continually study and apply both these important international documents to all work'. 37 There were similar attempts to enforce Comintern edicts. After the August 1930 ECCI, Pollitt directed British leaders: 'What we have to do is to make a sharp turn in another direction, that is our trade union work…We have to take a decisive turn to bring our comrades back into the trade unions'. 38 In the aftermath of the 1930 British Commission he reflected '…we have been isolated from all trade union activity' and reported 'a bulletin has been sent out to all Party bodies outlining the steps which must be taken to raise the agitation in trade unions'. 39 On his return from the April 1931 ECCI Plenum, Pollitt recorded: '…Manuilsky said that the Party had not realised the danger of its isolation from the workers, this had manifested itself in the desertion of the trade union work'. 40 Rust reiterated: 'every member must be mobilised for the carrying through of the policy of the CI…our inability to carry out mass activity along the lines and policy of the CI is one of the chief causes of the present situation'. 41 ECCI decisions were incorporated in CPGB resolutions. Yet by autumn 1931, R. W. Robson was complaining, 'our biggest weakness is in regard to trade union work…despite all leads sent out, despite all the work done by the leadership of the Party, there are large sections of the party membership which still do not appreciate the importance of the work in the Unions'. 42 Idris Cox added: 'only a small proportion of members joining the Party are members of trade unions and when they come into the Party no interest is shown by the local Party Committees in seeing that they become members'. 43 The following month the CPGB representative in Moscow, Robin Page Arnot, read a Comintern letter to the PB which stated: 'The situation in regard to the MM was dangerous…the line is not being carried out at all'. 44 His suggestion that 'at the end of the discussion a letter should be drawn up accepting the line of the Comintern…' 45 encapsulated the cycle of vigorous Comintern stimulus and deficient CPGB response -remedying political discourse but not grassroots action -that had prevailed since 1929.
This sketch justifies several conclusions. First, the Comintern insisted that working within the unions -at local level on the basis of workers' demands and the united front from below -was central to Class against Class and independent leadership. Second, this was accepted by CPGB leaders without exception. Third, unremitting pressure from Moscow ensured CPGB leaders were acutely aware of the gap between theory and practice and endeavoured to close it. Fourth, they achieved limited success. Fifth, the idea that the January resolution was the result of CPGB leaders persuading Comintern leaders to change the line and move away from independent leadership, or that Moscow permitted the party to elaborate its own line, is without substance. The perceived difficulty was implementing established policy; the resolution's purpose was clarification not revision. It was only the latest -albeit arguably distinctive in its codification and presentation -in a long list of attempts to impel the CPGB to practise its policy. So much is evident from the document's emphatic abbreviation of this dismal history:
THE GREATEST DEFECT OF THE PARTY'S WORK DURING THE PAST FEW YEARS IS THAT IT HAS
NOT CARRIED ON ANY SYSTEMATIC WORK IN THE REFORMIST TRADE UNIONS. In spite of international resolutions (V congress of the Red International of Labour Unions and the XI Plenum of the Communist International) not a single step has been taken so far to make the MM a really widespread revolutionary trade union opposition. 46 (Capitals in original).
Explaining the problem -and the January resolution's solution
How do we account for discontinuity between the line and its implementation? Two preliminary issues require more research . First, abandonment of union work raises questions about Communists' much-remarked fidelity to trade unions. 47 Second, this falling away may be magnified if the party's implantation in industry before 1928 has been inflated. Quantitative analysis is absent from the literature but a tentative hypothesis would hazard that, despite diffused influence, the CPGB's organized base in the unions was smallscale and fragile. 48 We also need more systematic information about 1929-1933. Nonetheless it is possible to outline certain factors salient to declining involvement.
The issue facing the leadership was how to transform members into a collective actor internalising and articulating successive Comintern scripts. Party managers were firmly committed to the new line. The capitalists, Pollitt explained, 'have the full force of the Trade Union Bureaucracy behind them…control of the machine gave the bureaucracy the power of life and death…it is ten times more difficult to work in the trade unions than it used to be'. 49 'The policy of the trade union leaders', he maintained, 'is Social Fascism'. 50 Independent leadership remained daunting and activists required education and direction: 'The big difficulty was to get the comrades in the Party clear on how to build the revolutionary trade union opposition'. 51 Unifying factory and branch activity was key: 'The comrades who attended the branches were the leaders of work in the workshop'. 52 J.R. Campbell, once critical of Class against Class, now keenly appreciated ultra-left strategy. 53 Willie Gallacher was another strong advocate, emphasising:
..the very powerful movement of the bureaucracy in the fight to disintegrate the forces of the working class…we could not, no matter how we spoke, over-emphasise the importance of breaking the power of the bureaucracy in the unions and winning the branches away from the support of the bureaucracy and around the support of independent struggle and leadership…in some of the industries we can get the support of the district committees and we must try to use them. 54 The anathema against miners' leader, Arthur Horner for refusal to recant his reversion to the old line confirmed the party elite's faith in Class against Class. But it also suggested uncertainty about aspects of practice as witnessed by habitual resort to Comintern guidance and visits by Pollitt and Rust during 1931 to consult with the ailing Rajani Palme Dutt, the only party figure who possessed theoretical acumen. 55 Redefining the role of the MM produced proposals from dropping its name to dissolving it. Official bans and proscriptions bolstered hostility from union members who identified the MM with disruption, sectarianism and splitting. An ineffectual, alternative labour movement in miniature, it constituted a barrier to union work. The party itself was tiny, its weaknesses exacerbated by disarticulation between higher party bodies, local committees and industrial activists which hindered effective communication of the line and motivating members to apply it. 56 It would be mistaken to deduce from documents that dwelt on members' debilities that the leaders always got things right. There were vacillations, for example, over the relationship of local officials to the machine and whether demands should be placed on the bureaucracy -its predictable resistance would illustrate its reactionary nature -or whether demands would encourage illusions in its ability to act in workers' interests. 57 Gallacher's lead to Communist miners in early 1931 -they should attend the official conference but if out-manoeuvred establish their own strike committeewent to the voluntaristic heart of independent leadership. 58 So did some of the sloganizing -'Strike now…the Communist Party is leading you' -and Salvation Army oratory outside factories as a substitute for contact with workers inside. 59
Rejecting 'loyal opposition', asserting unions could achieve little, diminished affinity with workers who believed in trade unionism. Exposure of social fascists generated denunciation more than argument, while independent leadership challenged union democracy. The breakaway unions, the United Mineworkers of Scotland (UMS) and the United Clothing Workers, incarnated disloyalty and impaired united front activity. The line lent itself to conflicting initiatives. It was possible for activists to prioritise factory agitation, union activity, working towards new unions or unemployed struggles -and counterpose one against the other, dissolving theoretical unity in fragmented practice. 60 Russian exhortations to independent leadership could encourage half-hearted attitudes to union intervention and privilege factory and strike committees embracing non-unionists: 'The masses must be organised and led if necessary without the trade union apparatus and against it; no fetish must be made of the trade unions'. 61 British formulations insisting on independent leadership 'whether inside or outside the unions is a matter of expediency' 62 could legitimise abstention, 'new union psychology', and illusions that unemployed and unorganized workers were more radical.
Campbell observed dispirited branch activity and attributed it to uncertainty about how far fascisisation extended. 63 Confusion and failure bred frustration and disillusion. Through 1931, faults were formally remedied -although some argued their leaders had not done enough to correct misunderstandings. But all members did not read party papers regularly. Only 25% bought the Communist Review, where policy was amplified. Difficulties were exacerbated by high membership turnover. 64 The nub of the problem was more fundamental: the new line was unrealistic in the circumstances. Economic crisis, as contemporary Marxists noted, can produce caution and conservatism rather than radicalisation. 65 The strike rate fell below that of the early 1920s.
Unemployment restrained militancy, victimisation curbed activism. By 1931 only 23% of workers remained members of unions which had been in sustained decline since 1921. On one estimate, 58% of CPGB members in London and 75% on Tyneside were unemployed, while 50% of members were recent recruits. 66 Demoralisation, marginalisation or retreat from trade unionism intensified.
In June 1931, only 37% of party members were in unions, compared with 53% the previous November. 67 By mid-1931, a Comintern/RILU operative in Britain concluded: 'Despite all resolutions and decisions, we have complete confusion among our comrades, even amongst some of the leading Party comrades, about the line, the tasks and the form of the MM…Our opposition inside the reformist unions has not seriously improved '. 68 Less dogmatic strategists may have changed course. Bound by Russian imperatives, Comintern leaders preferred to believe that recalcitrance was rooted in human fallibility and inadequate understanding. That they opted for emphatic reiteration not replacement is evident from studying the January resolution. All the components of the new line -crisis, radicalisation, social fascism, independent leadership, the united front from below, demands based on immediate needs -remained intact. The text exhorted the CPGB to advance along the line, not retreat to 1928, to distinguish its policy sharply from the reformist approach, not adapt to it, to intensify exposure of the bureaucracy, 'the agents of the enemy', and transform union branches from 'organs of class collaboration into organs of class struggle'. Horner's 'legalism' was brandished as a reminder of the pitfalls of regression to 'the old line'. There was no break with the established position regarding new unions: the resolution proposed development of the UMS and expanded on the urgency of preparing unofficial strikes. 69 The orientation to developing rank and file movements, such as the Builders' Forward Movement and the Members' Rights Movement which had emerged since 1930 outside the MM, was unquestionably new. But these were oppositional, unconstitutional groups, independent of, and antagonistic to, the bureaucracy. Based on union branches, intervention in them was considered a pathway back into union work, given the MM's marginality. But this was premised on attaining an established end: building independent leadership and the RTUO. Rank and file movements, the resolution insisted, must be led by revolutionaries. The resolution also opened upbut did not decide -the fate of the MM. It could not continue on its current basis: the extent to which the new movements would replenish or supersede it as the main inspiration of the RTUO was left undetermined, to be resolved by future events. The document challenged but did not liquidate the MM. To conclude it did is to read history backwards.
Taken as a whole, the resolution can hardly be characterised as a turn away from Class against Class. It is difficult to accept it represented '…a marked change in the party's trade union line' or that it should be interpreted 'as a major shift to the right'. 70 It was, for the most part, although Carr perhaps put it a little too dismissively, 'a repetition of formulas' disseminated since 1929. 71 As CPGB leaders, such as Gallacher and Robson remarked, there was nothing substantially new. What was novel was conditionality regarding the MM and, as Pollitt stressed, warnings of future accounting from the Comintern leaders, Kuusinen and Igor Piatnitsky. Unless matters improved within six months there would be dire consequences for the MM and the party leaders. 72
Harry Pollitt and the January resolution
The first more than rudimentary account of the January resolution by a historian was Central Committee dealt in practical terms with the development of workers' movements and Party building; it declared political work in the factories and trade unions to be decisive…'. 74 It was left to Branson, writing a decade later, to re-introduce the Comintern into the story -while maintaining that Pollitt was the decisive influence in what, she implies, had been a protracted campaign to change the Comintern line. The dearth of supporting evidence is disabling, particularly in view of her insistence that after 1928 '…the approach of those at Comintern headquarters was far more authoritarian, the dealings with affiliated parties more dictatorial…'. 75 With enhanced access to the Comintern archives, research in the 1990s and the new century tells us more about what happened in Moscow. Fishman explicitly assigns Pollitt the key role: …he told the Commission in Moscow that the Minority Movement…had become "boxed up in itself". He then executed a brilliant tactical sleight-of-hand by pointing out that other 'independent organisations' existed alongside trade unions, within which Party members were actually working successfully to achieve the goals of Class Against Class…He declared that these 'rank and file movements' were the embodiment of Independent Leadership, which could become the revolutionary trade union opposition. The Comintern Commission's report faithfully reflected Pollitt's submission including his tactical trick. 76 This resumé cites neither minutes nor reports of the conclave to justify its assertion of a causal link between Pollitt's 'submission' and the final resolution. The only evidence presented to corroborate the claim consists of two sentences urging the need to build the RTUO and the necessity to prepare strikes. Both these sentences are taken from Pollitt's speech to the 12 th CPGB Congress in November 1932. 77 78 In the précis of the discussion which followed we hear nothing concerning the content of what became the January resolution from the two Comintern leaders mentioned, Kuusinen and Boris Vassiliev. We are simply informed that they 'backed Pollitt and made helpful suggestions' while Lozovsky 'was highly critical'. 79 The implication is that Pollitt was the major protagonist. Comrade Pollitt has formulated the chief results of our discussions in the Secretariat so correctly that I believe I have nothing else to add to it. The only thing left for us to do is to formulate all this in the form of a resolution and it will be the duty of the Bureau of the Anglo-American Secretariat, together with the representatives of the British Party here, to work out such a resolution within the next few days. On the 29 th of this month the question is to come before the Presidium of the EECI. 81 The meeting of the Presidium described by Thorpe was the culmination of an extended collective and bureaucratic process; it was designed to consider the outcome of that process. 82 We do not know the extent to which their views influenced the outcome of what Pollitt referred to as "the inner commission." We do know that his speech to the December 29 Presidium was not a personal statement. He acknowledged that he was delivering the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the British Party: 'I will therefore endeavour to explain the main results that have come out of the discussions of the Commission as reflected in the resolution'. 83 There is little here to corroborate claims that Pollitt animated the January resolution.
Moreover, the context lends scant plausibility to the proposition. Kuusinen stated that nothing had been decided in advance and that production of the resolution would entail a collaborative exercise.
It is improbable that Pollitt rather than Kuusinen, Piatnitsky and Manuilsky -who represented the interests of the Stalinist state, and whose leadership in these deliberations Pollitt lavishly praisedhad the final say. 84 Kuusinen's assurance that the Comintern had not summoned the CPGB to replace its leaders but to deepen the project commenced in 1928, and Pollitt's complaint that the Comintern held his party in contempt, evoke the balance of forces. 85 The CPGB was a subordinate section whose leader was a Comintern appointee with a two year record of unredeemed promises and failure in the trade union field. There is insufficient in the evidence or the context to require us to invert the established hierarchy of political power and authority and assign the leading role in events to Pollitt.
It is safe to assume CPGB views found their place in the resolution, particularly with regard to rank and file movements. Discussion of these bodies had taken place earlier in 1931 within the party leadership. It was led by Gallacher and informed by reports of practical experiences from Frank Jackson, Campbell and Ernest Woolley. 86 There is no evidence the rank and file initiative was Pollitt's brainchild, although he certainly favoured it. By December 1931 the relationship of these movements to the MM remained contentious, and incomplete enlightenment was found in Moscow.
This brings us to the RILU council. Branson -highlighting the contribution of one participant, Pollitt -claims it witnessed 'the main battle' of the Commission, which was largely confined to the question of rank and file movements. 87 The debate at the council constituted a subordinate feature of the Commission. The ECCI constituted the crucial terrain. The RILU meeting was significant, not for Pollitt's speech, but for the three-hour peroration of Kuusinen. 88 Partisan perhaps -but Pollitt's shot at scapegoating RILU was more problematic. Only that spring he had counselled, 'if comrades will read carefully the RILU resolutions on the MM, they will find great stress is laid on the question of work inside the unions'. 95 There was, certainly, evidence of disagreements over the rank and file movements.
Emmerich felt they duplicated the MM, were too diffuse, and lacked support. 96 CPGB leaders -as distinct from members -were united behind the Comintern directives.
Nonetheless, historians have detected concealed hostility: 'the unanimous passage of the January resolution by the CC..did not mean that ultra-leftists like Rust were reconciled to a moderation of the party's line. Their acquiescence was tactical..'. 98 It is claimed that, as Pollitt and Campbell set about implementing the resolution, '…the Daily Worker under Bill Rust's editorship could not be relied upon to support them'. 99 Moreover, '..Rust's comment that they could not simply rely on the resolution -but would have to work out how to operate it in practice -was a scarcely-veiled hint that the struggle would continue'. 100 These judgements are unsubstantiated and inaccurate: on the evidence Rust was neither singularly ultra-left -the entire leadership purveyed ultra-left policiesnor hostile to the resolution; nor had he engaged in any 'struggle' preceding it.
Rust's condemnation of Communists quitting the reformist unions dated from 1930. 101 Through 1931 he partnered Pollitt at the helm of the party and in 1932 they anchored the Secretariat. Rust's reflections on turning proposals into practice were plausibly directed at determining issues such as the MM's future -in the context of the difficulties CPGB leaders had previously experienced in applying Comintern resolutions to British conditions. The statement quoted can be construed as hinting at antagonism to applying the resolution's prescriptions only by neglecting the accepted rules of interpretation. 102 Here is Pollitt at the British Commission responding to Comintern concern about the Daily Worker: 'I would like to say that there is no comrade who has progressed so rapidly as Comrade Rust, who is so sincere in his work and activity and the criticism of the Daily Worker is criticism against the Party and not any individual comrade'. 103 Misreading CPGB leaders stems from artificial schema which segregate them into seasoned realists, Comintern sceptics with union roots, around Pollitt, Campbell, Horner and Hannington; and ultra-left Comintern zealots -inappropriately packaged together as 'Young Turks' -including Rust, Allan, George Allison, Mahon, Robson, Walter Tapsell and Zinkin. 104 The insubstantiality of this fissure and the struggles it allegedly provoked have been demonstrated. 105 Through 1930 and 1931, the entire leadership was loyal to the line; inevitable differences of interpretation were secondary.
The only significant conflict flared briefly in autumn 1932. As we will see, it ranged Rust, Campbell and Dutt -who is rarely assigned a faction -against Pollitt and Gallacher, supported by the 'ultra- 
What's My Line? the trade union controversy of 1932
The months following the January resolution saw some progress. By summer sectarianism persisted and there was 'slackening off'. 107 Pollitt and Campbell's insistence that Party activity should be channelled inside trade unions assumed that the majority, the unorganised working class, could not be attracted to new revolutionary trade unions and that the "reformist" organized working class constituted the only potential fighting force…In the event, Pollitt and Campbell scored an easy victory at the Party Congress. They surrendered a small amount of ideological ground to the Young Turks without the slightest intention of allowing them to roll back the practical advances made by Party activists on the ground …Pollitt and Campbell were magnanimous in victory… 110 Thorpe's use of PB minutes took things forward. His narrative is handicapped by inadequate elucidation of the controversy's content. Explanation is replaced by imprecise reference to 'ultraleft', 'right', 'Pollitt's line' and 'Dutt's line'. This is particularly problematic as nowhere in his book does Thorpe discuss Third Period union strategy in any detail. After January, he asserts, circumstances '…allowed the trade union line to be taken to the right…'. 111 Pollitt, he claims, had Comintern support for this. On creating new unions, the Comintern hesitated '…to go the whole hog towards Pollitt's position…' but generally: …the line had drifted surreptitiously to the right…the CI was being coaxed along nicely and the party apparently submitting itself to the full implications of the January resolution. The plenum itself helped Pollitt's line. First, the main resolution stated that in Britain "a sharp turn must be made towards work in the reformist trade unions." Second, Piatnitsky stressed more strongly than in any previous statement of the class against class period that Communists "must fight against…Left tendencies as much as against the Right" …Pollitt had the Comintern seal of approval firmly in his pocket. 112 This is presented as the context to a conflict which pitted Pollitt and Gallacher against Dutt and Rust, with Campbell initially critical of Pollitt. The latter, 'emboldened by the encouragement he had received in Moscow said that he would "fight right up to the Congress" to ensure that his own line on the unions won through…Campbell stated his essential agreement with Pollitt and stressed that he had only demurred on issues of detail'. 113 The November Congress '…represented a clear victory for Pollitt and his strategy of moving the Party further away from the extremes of class against class…the trade union line was confirmed…This meant red unions were redundant…'. 114 These interpretations are contentious and require clarification. On any reading of the sources the main combatants were Pollitt and Gallacher confronting Campbell, Dutt and Rust. Ideas 115 There is no convincing evidence that in early 1932 'the line had drifted surreptitiously to the right.' Nor was the dispute about whether activists should organise within reformist unions or establish red unions. The January resolution sealed earlier settlement of these questions; in summer 1932 nobody in the leadership reopened them. The casus belli was not where but how, the political basis on which the work within reformist unions, which all championed, was to be conducted. 116 When policy demanded winning workers away from an impermeable, bourgeois apparatus, Pollitt's statement, 'we carry forward the fight inside the unions so that we can take them out of the hands of the present leaders to transform them into strong instruments and weapons in all our daily struggles' 117 suggested revisionism. Matters deteriorated when Allan pronounced TUC financial assistance for striking Lancashire cotton workers 'a magnificent display of solidarity', without locating it in the machinations of the bureaucracy -implying pressure worked and sowing illusions in reformist leaders. 118 Concern was compounded when a Glasgow railwayman, Macmillan, approbated and extended Pollitt's economism, asserting the Communist was in the unions, '…not to proclaim the doctrine of Karl Marx but to take his place beside his fellow workers in the everyday fight against wage cuts, against worsened conditions.' 119 Pollitt had not communicated what he was trying to do to his fellow leaders, Campbell or Rust -according to Dutt, Pollitt had put these views to him but been talked out of them -and was absent in Moscow for the Plenum and then in Lancashire, supervising the party's strike efforts. 120 When the September PB finally afforded opportunity for enlightenment the climate was further clouded by Gallacher's intemperate attacks on Dutt and Rust. Nonetheless, Campbell and Rust endeavoured to calm things, hazarding that Pollitt's preoccupation with union work had fathered clumsy formulations with unintended consequences: '…when you wrote this article … you were saying to yourself there is a weak part of our policy of independent leadership, the trade union work is not being attended to. I write this article to gee them up. But when this article is published comrades who do not know this line read it, in their minds it is something on the lines of back to the old policy…'. 121 Pollitt brushed aside the proffered olive branch and refused to concede all that was involved was maladroit pedagogy: I wrote an article on July 20 on the trade union question. I wrote with great care and made every formulation as I believe the question should be formulated. I understood very well at the time that it would have repercussions…subsequent experiences have only confirmed me in the correctness of my line. It is necessary to get the masses inside the trade unions, this is the decisive factor. I am not worried because Macmillan says something about Karl Marx…I do not want comrades to think I do not understand the seriousness of the issue…I am absolutely convinced that this is the only line possible in the Party. 122 Together with Gallacher he argued that activists could force the bureaucracy into action and transform unions. Their opponents were aware of the implications for independent leadership: if Pollitt was taken at his word, '…this question is not only of formulation but is the question of the line of the Party…we have reached a decisive conflict of opinion with regard to the line, with regard to trade union work'. 123 As Campbell put it '…we are altering the entire union line'. 124 Conviction that line-change, not simply strengthening the union drive, was part of Pollitt's purpose gained credence from his sustained failure to explain otherwise to the PB, particularly his close collaborators, Campbell, Dutt and Rust whose records on the union campaign were impeccable. Listing his own initiatives on that count since 1930, Dutt pinpointed the question: 'Not "for" or "against" the trade union drive but whether the present essential trade union drive is to be carried out on the basis of the old line or on the basis of the new line -this is the real issue'. 125 Pollitt was exhibiting 'a tendency… to revise the line of the Leeds Congress, of the International and of the RILU on the trade union question. We must correct this tendency…'. 126 The discussion continued through October. The CPGB operated without any developed theory of trade unionism relying on the Comintern model of an insurgent rank and file contained by a bureaucracy, located in the labour aristocracy, and now inclining towards fascism. What is to be Done? recently published in Britain was only partly understood. 127 The affair remains hard to assess: a stratagem of Pollitt, a gambit to maximise intervention in the unions, an improvised bid to revise the line -or both? There is insufficient evidence to conclude that he employed a calculated ruse. We cannot deduce absence of intention to change the line from his subsequent denial under fire -although scholars should also eschew teleology which transports the Pollitt of the popular front line back to 1932. 129 His problem was generating activity in unions. Experience had taught him the ultra-left line was inimical to that.
'Take the unions out of the hands of their leaders' appeared a superior mobilising slogan to 'unions are becoming part of the state and can achieve little for workers.' His dilemma was that variations on the latter theme had failed; but the former, he knew, unless he grossly misunderstood the Comintern position, to be politically unacceptable and divisive. 130 Historians do not have access to Pollitt's private thoughts. On the facts we have, what occurred was an attempt to float partial revision of strategy or suppress articulation of the politics of union work -which amounted to the same thing. Pollitt received support, but far from overwhelming approval, in the pre-Congress discussion; and criticism, particularly trenchant from 'George Pennington' and Mahon. 131 Harmony was restored to a leadership Gallacher had described as 'shattered.' 136 The line remained unchanged. The Congress decisions, fully in accord with the January resolution, envisaged sectional rank and file movements and MM groups working towards developing a replacement national centre, agitation in union branches, and securing posts as stewards, branch officials and conference delegates to build independent leadership manifested in a qualitatively more powerful RTUO. Pollitt declared war on 'trade union legalism' and members 'choked up with constitutionalism.' He criticised those 'who say that nothing can be done in the unions [and] the right who believe that the union apparatus can do everything and that the leaders can be made to fight.' He commended the UMS and stressed the need to develop it. 137 This was far from the 'clear' or 'easy victory' in shifting the CPGB from Class against Class denied. 142 The published article gives little indication the line had been revised. Nor do later reports in the party press. The relevant Congress documents disclose nothing that could be construed as altering the status quo. 143 Whether Pollitt, who left the Plenum after 'a day or two', misread the runes or was misled by Robson remain matters of conjecture. All available evidence confirms Dutt's verdict: 'The trade union drive is essential and all-important. The Twelfth Plenum has emphasised this. But the Twelfth Plenum does not say there is to be a revision of the trade union line, as laid down in previous congresses'. 144 
June in January: laying the foundations of the future?
This paper has argued that the January resolution, composed by the Comintern Commission and validated by the EECI, cannot be isolated from earlier history; nor should its significance be overestimated. Its animateurs, we have demonstrated, were Russian not British. Pollitt's part in it has been magnified. The text represented a turn within the Third Period, an essay in revitalisation not liquidation. The sources disclose no opposition from CPGB leaders but confirm there were subsequent attempts to go beyond the resolution. Confused and short-lived, they did not survive resistance, culminated in retreat and exercised little discernable impact on union work. The resolution, and the party congress decisions based on it, framed the immediate future. However, the harbinger of change came, not in January 1932, but in March 1933 which witnessed the first moves towards the united front, a process which broadened before and beyond the 1935 Comintern Congress. 145 Finally, the agency of the resolution in inaugurating an effective Communism in Britain -or more pertinently in British trade unions -can be exaggerated. By 1939, the CPGB had assembled a small but meaningful presence; but on the basis of very different policies from those advocated in the January resolution. The latter enabled progress by crystallising earlier exhortation that Communists become union activists. Subsequent success had more to do with developments after 1934 than with what happened at the turn of 1931. Supervening events exercised their own specific influence. There was no seamless evolution from the January resolution to what its authors would have branded the heretical reformism of the popular front.
The point is reinforced by the resolution's aftermath. The style of union work was more measured. It remained based on the same politics -albeit adumbrated in less frenzied fashion.
Recovery remained sluggish. The rank and file movements on the buses and railways provided the first shoots of influence in the transport workers and rail unions. Elsewhere -in tinplate, textiles, ports and print -such movements were marginal. With the exception of aircraft, they never blossomed in engineering or the electrical industries, although a burgeoning Communist presence on district committees facilitated winning official positions in key unions in those sectors. 146 The number of factory cells grew to eighty and in September 1933, the PB was informed of 'a big improvement' in union work; but only 30% of members were engaged in it. 147 There was no dramatic upturn in 1934. In April, Campbell reported progress on London Transport and the railways. Success in engineering was arguable while in mining, docks, textiles and among seafarers '…we have not advanced since the time of the January resolution'. 148 A Comintern representative in Britain observed that union work remained the responsibility of a handful of functionaries, not the party generally: 'That is the main reason why the Party is only slowly and hesitatingly carrying out the decisions of the last XII Party Congress'. 149 Party membership is an unsatisfactory index of union activity; nonetheless it declined from 5,600 in November 1932 to 5000 in February 1934. 150 Take-off was related to foreign policy innovation in Moscow and the serendipitous economic and industrial revival in Britain, 1935 Britain, -1938 , which combined to create a more amenable climate.
Social fascism was dropped, pressure on the bureaucracy and winning full-time positions rehabilitated, prohibition of the united front lifted. Political innovation dictated collaboration, compromise and conciliation. The expediential dynamics of trade unionism helped dissipate hostility. Matters should not be magnified. Bevin, Citrine, the TUC general council, and other leaders remained intractable. In a number of unions, notably the Engineers and Miners', the party achieved a degree of influence. By 1935, the MM and the RTUO had faded away. By 1937, they had been joined by most of the rank and file movements as the CPGB oriented towards the apparatus and the unity demanded by the popular front pitch. 151 The context was crucial. In January 1932 union membership was declining and continued to fall into 1933. Thereafter it grew from 4.3 million to 6.2 million in 1938. By that date, 30.5% of workers were in unions, compared with 22 % in 1933. There were 357 strikes in 1933 and 940 in 1939. Workplace organisation revived in key industries; shop steward numbers increased. Trends were uneven. 152 But expanding unions needed organisers and Communists were willing to serve and take advantage of a situation more favourable than at any time since the party's formation. That they grasped their opportunities was related only distantly to events in Moscow in the winter of 1931. Like the MM, the RTUO and social fascism, the January resolution was by 1939 an anachronism, an occasional reminder of a very different time.
